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The goal of this research is to describe the application of data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to the performance evaluations of bank branches. Special attention is focused 
on how to incorporate the quality dimension into branch efficiency. DEA will apply 
to a set of micro-data from a Czech commercial bank branch network. In the 
banking sector, providing services quality is one of the key focuses. Therefore, the 
quality dimension should be incorporated into the DEA model. The goal of the 
quality adjusted DEA model is to identify best practice branches that work 
efficiently and at the same time provide services with high quality. This model 
avoids productivity-quality tradeoff, which is present by the standard DEA model. 
The quality of services is measured by customer service, mystery shopping and calls, 
client information index, retention, and client product penetration. Main 
determinants of efficiency and quality level are branch size and region via 
purchasing power. 
 
Keywords: quality adjusted DEA, branch performance, scale efficiency, return to 
scale  
 



















The service economy consists of a large proportion of developing countries’ economic 
activity, and its growing development has raised the importance of maximizing organizations’ 
productivity. Organizations are searching for a benchmarking technique to identify best 
practices in supporting their decisions in order to receive effective utilization of resources.  
Organizations frequently use simple aggregate ratio analysis as a measure of their 
productivity. According to Camanho and Dyson (1999), Beamon (1999) and Reynolds (2004), 
ratio analyses are not sufficient
1 to measure productivity for organizations using multiple 
resources and providing multiple outcomes. To evaluate such organization’s performance, it 
needs more sophisticated, non-parametric benchmarking methods. Further advantage of the 
non-parametric method is the fact that it does not require specification of the production 
function form, which is required by parametric methods. Therefore, managers are interested in 
supporting their decisions through the use of academic methodologies, Brazdik and Druska 
(2005).  
The difficulties are further enhanced when the relationship between the inputs and 
outputs are complex and involve unknown tradeoffs as it is argued by Zhu (2009). It is 
particularly difficult for service industries to improve productivity and find substantial cost 
saving without sacrificing service quality. There are many subjective factors that affect 
productivity and service quality. A good example of an industry in which the quality of 
services is an important issue is the banking sector. In banks, such subjective factors 
influencing productivity include customers’ needs, behavior in receiving the service, service 
provider’s judgment, and skills in providing service. 
This research proposes a methodology to describe the application of a non-parametric 
benchmarking method, data envelopment analysis (DEA), for performance evaluations of 
bank branches. The advantage of DEA is its ability to measure the relative efficiency of 
branches by simultaneously analyzing their multiple resources with multiple outcomes. Based 
on the literature, there are proposals and applications for three different methods to 
incorporate the quality dimension into branch efficiency. Empirical results are discussed using 
a set of micro-data from a Czech commercial bank branch network (the bank).  
                                                           
1 The drawback of ratio analysis is its univariate nature. 2 
 
 
In the banking sector, providing services quality is a key focus. Therefore, the quality 
dimension should be incorporated into the DEA model. The goal of the quality adjusted DEA 
model is to identify best practice branches that work efficiently and at the same time provide 
high-quality services. This model avoids productivity-quality tradeoff, which is present in the 
standard DEA model. The quality of services is measured by customer service, mystery 
shopping and calls, client information index, retention, and client product penetration.  
At the end of last century in the Czech Republic, banks focused solely on the growth of 
new business volume and on new customer acquisition. Recently, due financial crises, 
however, they are encouraged to optimize their resources as well. They identified that with 
cost optimization, it is possible to receive further improvements. Moreover, it becomes more 
important to maintain customer retention to have valuable customers via selling more 
products to existing customers. Success is only possible through high-quality service. 
The essay is organized as follows. The following section contains a brief literature review 
on DEA research with special attention on studies with quality measurements. Section three 
discusses the details of how bank branch network provide services for clients, focusing on the 
input and output specification according to the motivation system and long-term strategy. 
Section four gives an overview of the theoretical DEA framework. It also specifies three 
different methods to incorporate the quality dimension. The fifth part summaries the results 




The original CCR model (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978) is the first DEA model 
that evaluates technical efficiency in a multiple-input and multiple-output framework. After 
that, the DEA technique has become a widely used approach for efficiency analysis in many 
public and private sectors
2 like universities, non-profit organizations, hospitals, and banks. 
Emrouznejad et al. (2008) presents the most extensive listing of DEA research, covering its 30 
years of history, theoretical developments, and empirical applications. 
During the 1990s, DEA method has been frequently used to evaluate the performance of 
financial and banking organizations. Oral and Yolalan (1990) and Oral et al. (1992) 
investigate in their empirical studies the relationship between branch efficiency and its profits. 
Further, Giokas (1991) was the first to evaluate branch efficiency with respect to size. It was 
followed by studies by Drake and Howcroft (1994), Tulkens (1995) and Schaffnit et al. 
(1997). Drake and Howcroft (1994) reported that more efficient branches had lower cost-
income ratios. They utilize data from a UK bank branch network. Schaffnit et al. (1997) use 
data from a large Canadian bank to show that branch efficiency has a positive effect on profit. 
An efficiency review of financial institutions is described in Berger and Humphrey (1997).  
Several studies have solely analyzed the efficiency of bank branches. Their 
comprehensive branch performance review was published by Camanho and Dyson (1999), 
where authors also describe an application of DEA used in the performance assessment of 
                                                           
2 There are several McKinsey working papers dealing with operational excellence in several industries, which are 
based on McKinsey 7S framework. The main source of academic work on the 7S model has to be the papers of 
Waterman et al. (1980, 1982). One of the elements of this framework is the strategy, which is discussed in Lynch 
(2005) more in details. 3 
 
Portuguese bank branches and show how DEA can complement profitability measures. Later, 
Sevcovic et al. (2001) focus on the problem of a suitable choice of efficiency measures, and 
they show how these measures can influence results. A dataset was provided by one of the 
leading banks in Slovakia. Most recently, Irsova (2009) compares two methods in bank 
efficiency, the stochastic frontier approach and DEA, which are supported by the meta-
regression part including several studies on the United States and transitional countries.  
Above mentioned DEA papers are dealing with efficiency from general perspective. The 
quality dimensions are getting part of efficiency analysis later on and they are discussed in the 
following section. Callen (1991) early identifies that most DEA studies do not consider the 
quality of services or products. Excluding quality can result in applying methods that increase 
efficiency by reducing quality. Quality in many areas is critical, but is not included in DEA 
models. These studies assume that quality is homogenous among investigated units or quality 
is independent of efficiency. Only few DEA studies explicitly address quality.  
First, Sherman and Ladino (1995) used DEA to substantially improve its branch 
productivity and profits while maintaining service quality. Athanassopoulos (1997, 1998) in 
his DEA studies of a Greek bank branch network considers the relationship of DEA 
productivity scores with quality. Bank branch operations are demonstrated by the effort made 
by management to pursue the banks’ corporate objectives, which consist of the tangible part 
described by the operating efficiency and the intangible part characterized by the quality of 
the provided services. Effort effectiveness is estimated by embodying three quality 
dimensions—approachability, location, and telephone service. These independent quality 
measures are developed based on customer surveys and the statistical relationship between 
quality and the outputs in the DEA model. The study, however, does not combine operating 
efficiency and quality into the effort effectiveness; the DEA scores are calculated without 
quality adjustment.  
Further, Soteriou and Zenios (1999) gain superior insight by simultaneously analyzing 
the design of operations together with the quality of the provided services and profitability, 
rather than by benchmarking these three dimensions separately. Other measures of service 
quality in banking are discussed in Athanassopoulos and Giokas (2000).  
Above mentioned results request research to find ways to properly combine quality and 
efficiency Sherman and Zhu (2006). Only few DEA studies explicitly address quality, and 
those that consider it have not fully adjusted for quality. This essay suggests how to enhance 
and fully adjust the standard DEA method by quality dimension. It also evaluates how the 
results change due to different quality measurements. 
3.  Banking sector providing services for clients 
 
Each DEA model is constructed to solve a concrete requirement. Therefore, formulation 
of DEA problems require an understanding of the production process, assumes deep industry 
knowledge, organization strategies with key motivation elements, as well as identification of 






3.1 Strategy  
The bank’s long term goal is to grow business profit through selling deposit and loan 
products
3. However, it is hard to manage new volumes. Branches have only limited control 
over new volumes that are determined by external factors, mainly by sales the potential of the 
region. Earning long-term profit growth in such a competitive industry is possible only by 
also focusing on other essential components. Therefore, banks’ recent strategy has also 
focused on rationalization of existing branches, cost optimization, and redeployment of 
surplus staff to new ones (step I). In addition, special focus is on the quality of service is 
provided to clients in order to meet their needs (step II).  
The key activity of the bank is based on the operation of the branch network, which 
represents the main contact point between customers and management of the bank. Officers in 
branches sell various types of deposit and loan products to generate profits. Therefore, 
branches and their employees are service providers. They have to understand customers’ 
needs, sell appropriate products, and provide high-quality services in order to receive loyalty 
and make customers more valuable. In order to operate efficiently, branches need to solve not 
only cost minimizing strategy, but also attract customers by offering high-quality services. 
 
3.2 Branch network 
Organization within the branch network and production process is a follows. There are 
large, medium, and small branches based on the number of employees
4. In branches, there are 
four types of client officers. Universal client officers are responsible for teller activities 
(standard transactions such as deposits, withdrawals, and bank checks). Officers deal with 
general and simple customer queries (opening bank account, travel insurance, payment, and 
credit card administration). Advisers deal with more complex activities according to its 
specialization.
5 Personal and firm bankers advise the most valuable clients, caring for their 
product portfolios. Finally, branch directors manage client officers and attend to the most 
important issues. 
 
3.3 Performance evaluation 
The bank uses two different methods to analyze the performances of its branches. The 
first is based on the volume of new business
6 within a year. Specialists measure savings and 
loan volumes separately on retail and firm portfolios. Savings contain all major deposit and 
investment products—current and savings accounts, term deposits, investment funds, pension 
funds, housing savings, and single and regular life insurance. Loans include all products with 
loan characteristics—consumer loans, credit cards, overdraft, housing loans, mortgages, 
investment loans, revolving, factoring, and leasing. Measured values are compared with the 
                                                           
3 It is not a common practice that banks measure RAROC or RORAC on the level of an individual retail and 
SME branch. Profit before tax that includes credit provisions is, however, frequently used as a KPI on a branch 
level. As regards income, it is mostly broader and consists of NII from assets and liabilities, net fee and 
commission income and income from financial operations. 
4 Small branches have up to 10 employees, medium branches have up to 20 employees, and large branches have 
more than 20 full time employees. 
5 For example, retail investment advisers offer services in investments of funds, and firm loan advisers help firms 
find the most appropriate loan for their business. 
6 New business volume is measured as the difference between a stage at the end of the year t and at the end of the 
year t-1. 5 
 
plan determined by top management and then the weighted averages of ranks in each category 
describe the final branch performance rank.   
The second method emphasizes branch activities. Activities are defined as the number 
of sold products (investment, housing loans and mortgages, non-specified loans, and SME 
loans) within a year and net increase in the number of active clients per number of branch 
employees. It has two dimensions—actual stage and growth. Branches receive rankings in 
each category. Some branches are new to high growth in these factors but have a poor actual 
stage. Most of the branches already have a very good actual stage, but they also have slow 
growth in several indicators. The best branches have a very good actual stage and very high 
growth in most of variables, and they serve as best practice branches for others. On the other 
hand, opposite branches need a special focus because they have a poor actual situation and 
poor growth. It is necessary to discover the reasons for external factors or poor management. 
The advantage of the second method is that it better reflects officers’ effort. While in a 
city with high purchasing power, on one investment deal, a branch can receive new volume of 
several million CZK, but effort from the officers is the same as in a small village for the 
investment in a volume of several thousand CZK. The more active officers have a branch with 
a better ranking through this method. 
Results of both methods are entering the motivation system for client officers, as their 
bonuses depend on them. The motivation system should reflect the company’s long-term 
strategy and should fairly reward the employees’ efforts in this direction. The management of 
the bank identified that long-term strategies should not be based solely on financial indicators 
(first method), but also how it is received and how much effort is needed (second method).  
 
3.4 Standard DEA application 
The above mentioned methods do not take into consideration the employee structure of 
branches and external factors such as the region’s purchasing power. They are unable to 
discover the source of inefficiency and how to deal with it in order to attain an efficient 
environment. Furthermore, even the second method does not take into account the quality of 
services. Considering activity alone is only a short-term issue. To maintain excellent long-
term results, it is necessary to know more about the clients and their needs, increase product 
penetration, and have high client retention. This can only be reached through high-quality 
service. Models excluding quality dimensions assume that quality is homogenous through the 
branches. 
Appropriately defined, the DEA model is able to solve some of the above mentioned 
weaknesses in the current performance measurements. The goal of the proposed standard 
DEA model is to find out the optimal resource allocations and minimize branch costs. It 
contains the following input and output factors.
7  
The best indicator for branch resources is branch size. To estimate branch size, the 
number of branch employees is used because personal costs are a major part of overall branch 
costs. In total, there are three input (resource) variables: UCO FTE—universal client officers 
and a branch director, Retail FTE—advisors and personal bankers for retail clients
8, and SME 
FTE—advisors and firm bankers for non-retail clients. FTE means the number of full time 
                                                           
7 Full definitions of these factors are in Appendix, Table A1 
8 Retail are all physical persons. SME are firms and physical entrepreneurs with annual turnover up to EUR 10 
million. Corporate clients are above this threshold and are not be included in DEA analysis. 6 
 
employees, which is adjusted to account for maternity leave, holidays, part-time workers, 
illness, and training. It explains how many full-time employees were present in a certain 
period in the branch.  
There are four output
9 measures—retail loans (consumer loans, credit cards, overdraft, 
housing loans, and mortgages), retail savings (current and saving accounts, term deposits, 
investment funds, pension funds, housing savings, and single and regular  life insurance), 
SME loans (overdraft, investment loans, revolving, factoring, and leasing), and SME deposits 
(current and saving accounts, term deposits, and investment funds).  
There are three different specifications. First, output factors are measured as new 
volumes within a year. This method favors branches in large cities, where clients are more 
likely to invest higher amounts, buy mortgages with higher values, or where bigger firms that 
are searching for large investment loans are located. Second, output factors are measures as 
above, but the volumes are divided by each branch’s town purchasing power index
10 in order 
to eliminate the effect of that external factor—discrimination of otherwise equally good 
officers employed in the region with low purchasing power. Results expected to be more 
homogenous. 
Third, output factors are measured as the number of new sold products, which reflects 
the client officers’ activities. The motivation behind this specification is that to measure what 
client officers are able to influence. They are able to use their services to influence certain 
clients to buy a mortgage at their bank instead of at a competitor’s, but they are not able to 
influence the volume of the mortgages. We believe that client officers are able to influence the 
number of sold products with their services. Therefore, output in the model is measured by the 
number of sold products, which should be a result of high quality service, number of meetings 
with clients, and other officer efforts.  
 
3.5 Quality adjusted DEA application 
The standard DEA model, however, is not quality adjusted and assumes that quality is 
homogenous among branches. However, this is not our case. Therefore, the basic DEA model 
is enhanced by the quality dimension. There are four quality measurements: service quality 
index, client information index, product penetration index, and client retention. The essay 
demonstrates short-term interaction among service quality and operating branch efficiency
11.  
The banking market is very competitive, and banks can no longer grow rapidly just 
through new acquisitions. It becomes more important to attain valuable customers through 
selling more products to existing customers and maintaining customer retention. Both of them 
are only possible through high-quality service. Therefore, the bank’s actual strategy is focused 
more on quality.
12 Service quality is considered very important because of high competition in 
the market and the value of retaining customers.  
                                                           
9 Manager business objectives (MBOs) are building upon 4 elements in the bank: profit including risk element, 
volumes as a proxy for market share, activities of the sales force (measured through number of meetings and 
sales in pieces) and the last is quality of services or customer satisfaction. Managers have higher weigh on the 
profit KPI and employees more on activities and customer satisfaction. 
10 It is a complex index that takes into consideration several external factors, such as unemployment, cost of 
living, etc., and therefore it is the most appropriate indicator.  
11 In reality, however, service quality has a substantial effect on branch efficiency rather on long-term prospects. 
Due to a lack of data for long-term forecast, we estimate only short-term interactions. 
12 A recent situation in the financial markets further confirms that quality of services is an important element. 
Customers require more explanations about investment products. They put their savings where they feel more 7 
 
If you know more about your customers, you can better manage customer relationships 
and you can have a better idea of what customers need and their interests. Consequently, you 
can sell them more appropriate products. Customers will be more satisfied, will be more loyal, 
and will return. Their churn will be lower when the bank utilizes long-term business growth. 
Therefore, it is important to measure and be under the control of these indicators. There are 
several measurements of how banks currently control and try to increase service quality.
13  
First, the bank creates a service quality index, which has three parts: customer service, 
mystery shopping, and mystery call. Each of them is focused on the quality of officers’ 
willingness and proficiency. Customer service is a certain type of meeting between a client 
officer and an existing customer in order to maintain the customer relationship, to identify 
customer needs, and finally, to increase the probability to sell a new product. Client officers 
should proactively address clients and thoroughly prepare in advance for the meeting based on 
available information about clients, their past needs, and interests. Correctly done, customer 
service meetings encourage branch sales results. Therefore, client officers are motivated to 
arrange meetings with clients, and they have to fulfill a certain number of customer service 
meetings with their customers. Fulfillment of the branch plan is given by a score for customer 
service.  
Mystery shopping is evaluated by a mystery shopper posing as a customer from an 
external consulting firm. A mystery shopper visits a branch in order to receive information 
about certain types of products, advice in investment, or to receive mortgages and other loan 
products. During the visit, he evaluates several aspect of service, mainly quality and 
correctness of provided information and ability to communicate well with a customer. In 
advance, the mystery shopper is educated on what high-service quality looks like, correct 
answers, and what he can and cannot do. After the visit, he fills out an evaluation form, 
indicating which tasks were fulfilled and which are not. Based on these figures, a branch 
receives another quality score. Each time the mystery shopper visits, he focuses on a different 
topic, product need, or client officer’s seniority level.  A mystery call is very similar to 
mystery shopping, but in this case, the mystery customer calls the branch. Client officers have 
to give a correct answer on the counterparty question and offer a personal meeting at the 
branch. Based on the behavior of the officer and the accuracy of the answers, the branch 
receives a third quality score. Finally, these three quality scores are put together to create a 
complete service quality index, which is evaluated on a monthly basis.  
Second, there is the client information index. Client officers should put information 
about clients into the internal system, like phone numbers, emails, ID cards, education, job, 
incomes, and expenses. The client information index expresses how much information is 
recorded in the internal system about the branch customers. Of course, there is a causality 
problem between owned products by customers and available customer information at the 
banks. Selling certain products like mortgages is conditioned to deliver a lot of special 
information from customers regardless of how active the officers are. Basic products such as 
current accounts or savings do not need any additional information from clients to deliver. 
However, more active officers should receive more information from customers regardless of 
which products they own. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
safety or search for more appropriate mortgages that fit their needs and are flexible. If they do not see high-
quality service or confidence, they quickly change banks or just leave their savings at home. Customers start to 
value the quality of services. 
13 A full definition of quality indicators are in Appendix, Table A2 8 
 
Third, there is the product penetration index.
14 It is very important to have customers 
with more than one product. Customers with more products are less likely to leave the bank. 
Therefore, the bank’s long-term objective is good cross selling. Client officers are motivated 
to sell mortgages together with life insurance and possibly credit cards. With customers who 
just open a current account, officers attempt to sell them debit cards with advantaged travel 
insurance for the whole family. In this way, there is lower probability that customer is going 
to conduct business with competitors; customers will be more loyal, and the bank will 
generate higher profits.  
Forth, there is client churn or retention. Monitoring the client churn (and the reasons 
for leave) is inevitable. Active customers are the most important assets. Clients who are 
dissatisfied with quality service are more likely to leave. Therefore, client retention is a good 
estimation of service quality.  
 
All of these aspects contribute to the overall performance of the branches, and they are 
controlled fully (SQI index) or partially (client information index, product penetration index, 
and client retention) by client officers. Therefore, they should be incorporated into the DEA 




Section three gives an overview of the theoretical DEA framework. It also specifies 
three different methods of how quality is possible to incorporate. The proposed methodology 
follows Sherman and Zhu (2006) using real data from a branch network. 
 
4.1 Standard DEA framework  
DEA is a linear programming technique for measuring the relative efficiency of a 
homogenous set of Decision Making Units (DMUs, which in this study are branches) by 
analyzing their multiple inputs with multiple outputs. It identifies a subset of efficient best 
practices branches through a piecewise linear envelopment of observed data. For the rest of 
the branches, the magnitude of their inefficiency is measured by the distance from the 
envelope of best practice branches. DEA derives a summary measure of efficiency for each 
branch. It also derives what would be the optimal combination of input and output for 
inefficient branches. This means that DEA allow us to not only say whether a certain branch is 
efficient or not, but also which inputs and outputs are the sources of inefficiency.  
The original CCR model (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) is the first DEA model, 
which evaluates technical efficiency in a multiple input and multiple output framework. The 
CCB model assumes constant return to scale, i.e., outputs increase by the same proportion as 
inputs. This assumption is appropriate only when all DMUs operate at an optimal scale. In 
general, however, this is not true in many sectors. The banking sector is a good example 
because there is a significant difference between small and large branches’ activities. This 
indicates the existence of a variable return to scale. Therefore, in this essay, the BCC model 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) is applied to estimate efficiency, which assumes a 
                                                           
14 The penetration index is based on Finalta definitions. Each of the following products is counted with equal 
weight: current account, saving account, term deposit, investment fund (including pension savings), life 
insurance, consumer finance (including consumer loan, overdraft, and credit card), and mortgages. 9 
 
variable return to scale. During the 1990s, the DEA technique became a widely used approach 
for efficiency analysis in many public and private sectors, such as universities, non-profit 
organizations, hospitals, and banks. We use input-oriented
15 (cost-minimizing) BCC models; 
the envelopment model and its dual specifications are demonstrated in Table 1.   
 
 
Table 1 Input-oriented BBC model with variable return to scale, Envelopment model and its 
dual problem Multiplier model 
  Envelopment model  Multiplier model 
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In the model, there are n branches, where every branchj, j = 1,2,…,n  produces s outputs 
in different amounts yrj (r=1,2,…s) using m inputs in different amounts xij (i=1,2,…,m). In 
addition,  > 0 is a non-Archimedean element defined to be smaller than any positive real 
number. The presence of in the objective function effectively allows minimization over  to 
preempt the optimization involving the slacks  0 , 
 
r i s s  (Cooper, Seiford and Zhu, 2004). 
Brancho is efficient if and only if 




r i s s  for all i and r. Brancho is weakly 
efficient if and only if 




r i s s  for some i and r. 
The complete theoretical background of the applied DEA methods is described in more 
detail in studies such as Cooper et al. (2004) or Zhu (2009). The efficiency measurement used 
in this study was created by Tone (1993) with respect to proportional and non-proportional 
slacks. It was followed by Sevcovic et al. (2001) that also analyzed several efficiency 
                                                           
15 Expansion on the market is limited, and it is more difficult to manage output increase than optimizing 
resources. We assume that outputs are given exogenous variables and searching for optimal input for each 
branch. Therefore input oriented strategy is chosen and with this kind of strategy is possible to receive further 
improvements as earlier discussed. 10 
 
measures. The next sections describe how to enhance and fully adjust the standard DEA 
method using a quality dimension. 
 
4.2 Method I — Quality indicator as an Output in DEA model 
This is the first method that reflects the quality dimension in branch performance. In this 
specification basic DEA model is enhanced with one more output, a quality indicator. It is 
true that the DEA efficiency will not decrease if additional output is included. Therefore, 
some branches, which were inefficient in a standard DEA model, are becoming efficient. In 
addition, there could be several branches that are efficient but have low quality, as measured 
by a certain indicator. In these cases, high productivity compensates for low quality. Quality–
productivity tradeoff is present. However, in many applications, this kind of tradeoff is not 
acceptable.
16 Benchmark branches should have high productivity with high quality. In Model 
II and III, there are suggestions on how to avoid quality–productivity tradeoff. 
 
4.3 Method II — Quality indicator as an independent factor  
In Method II, quality indicator is not included to the basic DEA model, but it is treated 
independently. In this way, it is possible to avoid quality–productivity tradeoff. All branches 
have two independent dimensions—productivity (from DEA model) and quality. Each branch 
has its own place in the two-dimensional chart. It is necessary to set a cut-off for high 
productivity and a cut-off for high quality in a way that meets operation objectives. Cut-off 
for high productivity should be 1, and for high quality, it should be the top 20 or 50 percentile 
through all branches. The two-dimensional chart is split up into four quadrants: high 
productivity and high quality (HP-HQ), high productivity but low quality (HP-LQ), low 
productivity but high quality (LP-HQ), and low productivity and low quality (LP-LQ). 
Branches in the quadrant HP-HQ are the best practice benchmark branches. In this two-
dimensional chart, it is possible to depict the relationship between efficiency and quality. 
However, efficiency measurement with respect to quality is not possible to quantify this 
model.  
A similar approach was done by Camanho and Dyson (1999), where the authors situated 
bank branches in an efficiency–profitability matrix and analyzed the relationship between the 
DEA efficiency measure and profitability measure used by a bank. Soteriou and Zenios 
(1999) published a similar method enhanced by the quality of services in banks. In addition, 
Brazdik and Druska (2005) applied the DEA efficiency score–revenue performance chart for a 
mobile telecommunication network. 
 
4.4 Method III — Quality adjusted DEA model 
Another way to eliminate the quality–productivity tradeoff and simultaneously quantify 
efficiency measurement with respect to quality is to apply a quality-adjusted DEA model. A 
quality-adjusted DEA model is a multi-level DEA model where non-efficient branches are 
compared only with best practice branches that are efficient (first level) with high quality 
(multi level).  
More precisely, at the end of each level, the efficiency score is calculated for all 
branches according to the DEA model that also includes the quality dimension. Those 
branches that are efficient but with low quality are eliminated and do not enter the next level. 
                                                           
16 Or should be within a certain limit 11 
 
This iteration is finishing at that level, where all efficient branches have high quality as well. 
Therefore, they are benchmark branches. The inefficiency score of all other branches are 
calculated relative to these best practice branches according to variable benchmark methods 
applied on e-commerce banking activities Cook et al. (2004) and later in Zhu (2009). 
5.  Results 
 
5.1 Standard DEA framework 
In this section, there is a summary of results obtained by non-parametric DEA models. 
The empirical results are received from the analysis of 185 bank branches based on their 
figures for the year 2007. These branches deal with individuals and small business enterprise 
accounts as well. Their activities are considered reasonably homogenous. The input and 
output specification
17 of the standard DEA model with its descriptive statistics are in Table 2.  
 
Table 2  Description statistics of inputs and outputs of the standard DEA model
18, data are 
related to the year 2007 
Variables  Obs.  Median Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Inputs (in # persons)       
SME FTE  185  0.0 2.1 3.6 0.0 15.8 
Retail FTE  185  1.3 2.5 3.3 0.0 19.4 
UCO FTE  185  7.0 8.8 5.5 2.8 32.1 
FTE  185  8.9 13.4 11.7 3.0 64.0 
Outputs (in million CZK )     M – Volume *
Retail Savings  185  58 94 135 0 1269 
Retail Loans  185  74 110 124 2 898 
SME Deposits  185  52 90 121 0 836 
SME Loans  185  252 322 204 0 1257 
Outputs (in million CZK )     M – Volume
Retail Savings  185  56 86 124 0 1276 
Retail Loans  185  72 100 99 2 677 
SME Deposits  185  51 83 107 0 841 
SME Loans  185  244 309 209 0 1264 
Outputs (in # contracts)     M – Count
Retail Savings  185  1257 1682 1269 206 6642 
Retail Loans  185  363 444 287 61 1657 
SME Deposits  185  106 150 145 4 925 
SME Loans  185  48 71 63 0 310 
 
 
There are three specification of the standard DEA model. First, output factors are 
measured as new volumes within a year (M–Volume*). Second, in order to eliminate the 
effect of purchasing power as an external factor, outputs are measured as new volumes within 
a year adjusted by regional purchasing power (M–Volume). Third, output factors are 
measured as the number of new products sold (M–Count). Models based on new volumes 
identify 33-34 branches as fully efficient and 151-152 branches as inefficient, i.e., 18% of 
branches are efficient (see Table 3). The average efficiency of all branches in the network is 
74%. Model developed on number of sold products, however, identifies 54 branches as 
efficient, and the average efficiency is 84%. These results indicate that branches are more 
homogenous with respect to the number of new products sold and their variations are lower.  
However, the average efficiency, 74-84%, implies that there is room for improvement through 
optimal resource allocations. 
 
                                                           
17 Defined earlier, located in Appendix, Table A1 
18 Volume of new business is defined as difference between end-year and start-year stage. Therefore branches 
could have negative grow of AUM or loans. These figures are entering to the model as zero outputs. 12 
 
Table 3  Basic statistics and average efficiency of the branch network  
Model  Number of efficient branches  Median Mean St. dev. Min Max 
M–Volume*  33  74% 74% 19% 27% 100% 
M–Volume  34  72% 74% 19% 28% 100% 
M–Count  54  89% 84% 15% 49% 100% 
 
 
According to the characteristics of efficient branches, it is possible to recommend the 
optimal branch size. Efficient branches are mainly (54-59%) small branches with 4-6 
universal client officers, as shown in Table 4. However, among efficient branches, there are 6-
12 medium sized and 7-13 large branches as well. Advisors and personal and firm bankers are 
only efficient in medium and large branches. Most of the efficient branches are located in 
Region A and Region G.
19 In Region A, there is the highest purchasing power, which has a 
positive external effect on branch efficiency in the model M–Volume.* On the other hand, 
Region G has the lowest purchasing power, where excellent management of branches over 
performs the negative external factor. 
 
Table 4 Characteristics of efficient branches 
Model  Number of efficient branches  Branch size Branch category Region
M–Volume*  33  5‐6 FTEs (4) Small (20) Region A (10)
M–Volume   34  5 FTEs (5) Small (20) Region G (10)




Findings indicate that an optimal branch network should contain a high number small 
sized branches with only universal client officers and some medium and large branches 
focusing on personal and firm bankers and advisors’ activities. Frequently, branch sizes of 4-6 
FTEs indicate that the optimal branch size should be within this interval. Moreover, in the 
future, it will be optimal to open small branches or redeploy client officers from larger 
branches to several small ones. 
Efficiency score was used to calculate performance rankings of the branches. The 
sensitivity of results with respect to input-output model specifications was evaluated by 
calculating the Spearman rank correlation
20 coefficients and by testing statistics for 
significance of rank correlation coefficients. Results in Table 5 show that all estimated 
correlation coefficients are significant, but there is only moderate positive relationship 
between average efficiency by models M–Volume and M–Count, i.e., branches that operate 
efficiently with respect to sold products are not necessary operated efficiently with respect to 
new volumes on those products. These results suggest not a high sensitivity of input-output 
model specification. 
 
Table 5 Spearman rank correlation coefficients among three standard DEA models  












                                                           
19 Regions are characterized by its purchasing power. Region A has the highest purchasing power, while Region 
G has the lowest purchasing power 
20 Defined in Spearman (1994), and it is commonly used to compare rankings 13 
 
In order to identify determinants of efficiency, a correlation analysis was done.
21 
Interestingly, there is negative relationship among M–Volume, M–Count, and purchasing 
power (Table 6). This indicates that branches with higher purchasing power are less efficient 
because they are not able to fully utilize the region’s good purchasing power, they do not sell 
enough products, or they do not have high enough volumes of new products. They have 
comparable new volumes on deposit and loan products with branches in lower purchasing 
power regions,
22 but after eliminating the positive effect of purchasing power, the relative 
value of new volumes on products tend to be lower. In particular, is true for Region A, where 
the purchasing power is the highest. 
 
Table 6 Correlation coefficients among average efficiencies of three standard DEA models, 
external factors like purchasing power (PP) and branch size (FTE) 






















Another insight gives a negative relationship between M–Volume efficiency and branch 
size, i.e. larger branches are less efficient in terms of new product volume. However, branch 
size has no influence on efficiency based on the number of sold products.  
Table 7 shows the reported average efficiency results with respect to region and branch 
size. There are significant variations among regions and branch sizes. Region A is the only 
region where the average efficiency is lower in the model M–Volume than M–Volume* (p-
value at t-test of means is 0.000). It is due to the highest purchasing power in the region that 
branches are not able to fully utilize. Branches in Region A are the least efficient according to 
the number of new sold products. There is room for improvement. The most efficient 
branches are located in Region D.  
 



























Region A  89%  18%  83%  20%  84% 17% 10 77% 19% 63% 17%  60%  15% 7
Region B  56%  8%  57%  11%  83% 6% 3 59% 14% 65% 22%  72%  18% 5
Region C  44%  12%  48%  16%  89% 12% 6 61% n/a 69% n/a  94%  n/a 1
Region D  57%  11%  60%  12%  91% 16% 3 74% 17% 77% 17%  98%  3% 6
Region E  46%  11%  49%  12%  74% 9% 5 62% 8% 64% 9%  70%  15% 3
Region F  74%  20%  77%  19%  92% 10% 4 75% 22% 81% 22%  91%  13% 7
Region G  66%  27%  70%  24%  89% 18% 6 57% 18% 66% 20%  94%  7% 9



























Region A  77%  15%  69%  14%  73% 14% 21 80% 17% 72% 18%  73%  17% 38
Region B  78%  15%  78%  14%  84% 15% 16 71% 17% 73% 17%  81%  15% 24
Region C  74%  16%  75%  18%  83% 15% 15 65% 20% 67% 21%  85%  14% 22
Region D  88%  11%  89%  10%  94% 8% 12 79% 17% 82% 16%  95%  8% 21
Region E  80%  14%  80%  14%  85% 12% 20 72% 18% 73% 18%  81%  13% 28
Region F  81%  19%  81%  18%  87% 13% 12 78% 20% 81% 19%  89%  12% 23
Region G  79%  20%  84%  20%  93% 9% 14 70% 23% 75% 22%  92%  11% 29
All   79%  16%  79%  16%  84% 14% 110 74% 19% 74% 19%  84%  15% 185
 
                                                           
21 Regression analysis gives similar results, therefore, we present only the correlation coefficients with p-values 
22 There is no correlation between M–Volume* efficiency and purchasing power, i.e., the correlation is 0.077. 14 
 
 
In general, larger branches are less efficient with respect to new volume. The 
explanation should be in the branch organization
23 and in fact that larger branches have larger 
customer portfolios that include a higher proportion of less valuable clients. The exception is 
in Region A, where large branches are the most efficient. Behind this interesting result is the 
fact that in Region A, small branches are not standalone branches but are connected to one of 
the large branches. 
 
5.2 Quality indicators 
Four main types of quality indicators—penetration index, service quality index, client 
information index, and retention—are investigated in more detail.  
 
Correlation among quality indicators 
Interestingly, there is a relevant positive relationship between penetration index and 
retention (Table 8). Branches where clients have, in average, more products tend to have more 
loyal customers as well. There is a naturally negative correlation between all factors and 
product 1, which is defined as the percentage of customers with exactly one product. The most 
important part of the SQI index is mystery shopping (SQI II) and mystery calls (SQI III), 
which are highly correlated. However, there is low correlation between customer service (SQI 
I) and other parts of service quality index. It is because the number of customer service 
meetings is a rather quantitative indicator and other parts of the service quality index measure 
real quality service. Those branches that have high-quality service have, on other hand, less 
customer service meetings, which indicates a certain level of tradeoff.  
 
Table 8 Correlation coefficients among quality indicators 






































































































Penetration – penetration index, Product 1- portion of customers with exactly one product, Product 2+ - portion of customers with 
more than 1 products, Product 3+ - portion of customers with more than 2 products, SQI – service quality index, SQI I – customer 
service, SQI II – mystery shopping, SQI III – mystery call, Retention – percentage of customers who were active in the whole year, 
Information – client information index, p-values are in the brackets 
 
Correlation between quality indicators and external factors 
                                                           
23 They employ more special client officers, such as personal and firm bankers or advisers who are not able to 
bring sufficiently valuable clients to the branch portfolio. 15 
 
There is a significant relationship among branch characteristics, efficiency results, and 
quality indicators. Branch size measured as FTE has a negative correlation with SQI, 
especially SQI II and III, but a positive relationship with SQI I. This indicates that at larger 
branches, there are lower quality services; they are focused on quantity as a number of 
customer service meetings. Hence, there should be a large tradeoff between quality and 
quantity. At these branches, the organization is not effective. There is a large hierarchy at the 
expense of quality. On the other hand, in small branches, client officers know each other. 
They can easily cooperate and help each other, which indicate higher service quality 
appreciated by customers, as measured by mystery shopping or mystery calls. In addition, 
Table 9 shows a weak positive correlation between branch size and penetration index. The 
bigger the branch, the more products their clients tend to have. However, there is no 
significant relationship with retention. 
 
Table 9 Correlation coefficients among branch size (FTE), purchasing power (PP), average 
efficiency and quality indicators 
















































































































p-values are in the brackets 
 
Purchasing power has a negative correlation with penetration index and SQI. As the 
highest purchasing power is in region A, they have the lowest service quality and the lowest 
product penetration. The latter is due to a larger proportion of foreigners in region A who have 
just one product—a current account. Further, purchasing power has a slightly positive 
relationship with the client information index and no relationship with retention. Results 
demonstrate that client officers know their customers better in regions with higher purchasing 
power. 
The average efficiency of M–volume and M–count models has a positive relationship 
with penetration index and SQI. These are the most important quality indicators that influence 
branch efficiency.
24 On the other hand, there is no connection among retention, client 
information index, and efficiency.  
 
5.3 Method I — Quality indicator as an Output in DEA model 
This is the first specification of the standard DEA model, where quality is included as an 
additional output factor. In order to test the sensitivity of results by adding one additional 
                                                           
24 Again, a similar result is obtained by regression analysis. 16 
 
quality output factor, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient was calculated. All estimated 
correlation coefficients are significant and their value range between 0.870-0.991, which 
suggests the low sensitivity of model specification. This is in line with the arguments in 
section 4.2. 
However, here it is demonstrated that this DEA model does not solve the tradeoff 
problem between quality and productivity.
25 The tradeoff is present and its magnitude differs 
with respect to a quality indicator, branch size, and region, as shown below in Table 10-11.
26  
 
Table 10 Tradeoff by quality indicator and model type 
     M–Count model M–Volume model 
Quality indicator  Obs.  Efficiency  St. dev. Effective Trade off Efficiency St. dev.  Effective  Trade off
Penetration  185  85%  15% 60 28% 75% 19%  42  29%
Product 1
27  185  88%  14% 73 53% 79% 19%  45  44%
Product 2+  185  85%  15% 58 26% 75% 19%  39  36%
Product 3+  185  85%  15% 62 32% 75% 19%  40  30%
SQI  185  86%  15% 67 31% 75% 19%  41  34%
SQI I  185  87%  15% 77 36% 77% 19%  50  32%
SQI II  185  86%  15% 63 37% 76% 19%  45  31%
SQI III  185  87%  15% 73 41% 76% 19%  44  36%
Retention  185  85%  15% 61 44% 75% 19%  37  51%
Information  185  86%  15% 66 55% 75% 19%  38  47%
 
Efficiency – average efficiency by the DEA model, St. dev. – standard deviation of efficiency, Effective – number of effective 
branches, Tradeoff – percentage of effective branches with low quality 
 
The productivity-quality tradeoff ranges between 28-55% with a std. deviation of 9% in 
cases of M–Count model, and it ranges between 29-51% with a std. deviation of 8% in cases 
of M–Volume model.  There is a high tradeoff in M–Count and M–Volume models with the 
mystery shopping quality indicator (SQI II), which are mainly valid at large branches (Table 
11). Similar results were seen for mystery calls (SQI III). Here, high productivity compensates 
for low quality. Large branches have lower quality measured by mystery shopping and 
mystery calls, but they are more focused on quantity. As a consequence, there is a large 
productivity-quality tradeoff. Interestingly, a large tradeoff in the retention indicator is driven 
by smaller branches. On the other hand, lowest tradeoff is assigned to a DEA model with a 
penetration index. Penetration index itself is a good predictor of efficiency, and therefore, they 
off the lowest tradeoff.  
 
Table 11 Tradeoff (percentage of effective branches with low quality) by quality indicator and 
branch size 
M–Count model M–Volume model 
Quality indicator  LB  MB  SB All LB MB SB  All 
Penetration  20% (3) 23% (3)  34% (11) 28% (17) 11% (1) 38% (3) 32% (8)  29% (12) 
Product 1  56% (9) 53% (9)  53% (21) 53% (39)  44% (4) 40% (4) 46% (12)  44% (20) 
Product 2+  29% (4) 23% (3)  26% (8) 26% (15) 38% (3) 38% (3) 35% (8)  36% (14) 
Product 3+  12% (2) 31% (4)  44% (14) 32% (20) 0% (0) 43% (3) 38% (9)  30% (12) 
SQI   57% (8) 24% (4)  25% (9) 31% (21) 75% (6) 38% (3) 20% (5)  34% (14) 
SQI I  32% (6) 39% (7)  38% (15) 36% (28) 25% (3) 50% (5) 29% (8)  32% (16) 
SQI II  64% (9) 23% (9)  31% (11) 37% (23) 63% (5) 38% (3) 21% (6)  31% (14) 
SQI III  73% (11) 53% (8)  26% (11) 41% (30) 100% (7) 63% (5) 14% (4)  36% (16) 
Retention  25% (4) 29% (4)  61% (19) 44% (27) 38% (3) 71% (5) 50% (11)  51% (19) 
Information  69% (6) 63% (5)  44% (12) 55% (23) 57% (4) 63% (3) 39% (10)  47% (17) 
 
LB – large branch, MB – medium sized branch, SB – small branch, in brackets are number of observations 
                                                           
25 Cut-off for high productivity is set at 1, and cut-off for high quality is set in the 50% percentile through all 
branches. 
26 Tradeoff by quality indicators and region is shown in Appendix, Table A3. 
27 Quality indicator Product 1 is an “opposite” indicator, the highest is the worst quality and consequently if you 




The volume of tradeoff by region is presented in the Appendix, Table A3. There is a 
large tradeoff in DEA models with a quality indicator service quality index of 83%-100% in 
Region A, which clearly indicates that in Region A, client officers are motivated by the 
quantity of the sold products, while quality takes second place. However, the lowest tradeoff 
is in Region F.  
 
5.4 Method II — Quality indicator as an independent factor  
In the second specification of the standard DEA model, quality is treated independently 
to avoid quality-productivity tradeoff. Each branch is characterized with its DEA and quality 
score. Based on these scores, they are in one of the four quadrants defined in the previous 
section. Average efficiency and average value of quality indicators within these quadrants are 
presented in Table 12 and in Appendix, Table A4. 
The best practice branches are located in Quadrant 1. Their average efficiency score is 
100%, and their average value of quality indicators is above the cut-off value. Branches in 
Quadrant 2 are those where efficiency is 1, but the value of quality indicators is low, below 
the cut-off.  
 
Table 12 Average efficiency and average value of quality indicators according to the quadrants 
M – Count  Average efficiency Average value of quality indicator
Quality indicator  1  2  3 4 All 1 2 3  4  All  Cut‐off
Penetration  100% (37)  100% (17)  80% (56) 76% (75) 84% 1.61 1.48 1.60  1.46  1.54  1.54
Product 1  100% (15)  100% (39)  76% (74) 81% (57) 84% 0.62 0.54 0.63  0.55  0.59  0.58
Product 2+  100% (39)  100% (15)  81% (56) 75% (75) 84% 0.46 0.37 0.45  0.37  0.41  0.42
Product 3+  100%(34)  100% (20)  79% (61) 77% (70) 84% 0.12 0.08 0.12  0.07  0.10  0.10
SQI  100% (34)  100% (20)  81% (59) 75% (72) 84% 0.89 0.81 0.90  0.82  0.85  0.86
SQI I  100% (28)  100% (26)  80% (61) 76% (70) 84% 0.92 0.78 0.94  0.77  0.85  0.87
SQI II  100% (32)  100% (22)  83% (63) 74% (68) 84% 0.74 0.57 0.76  0.57  0.66  0.67
SQI III  100% (25)  100% (29)  83% (67) 73% (64) 84% 0.93 0.85 0.94  0.85  0.89  0.90
Retention  100% (27)  100% (27)  77% (59) 79% (72) 84% 0.94 0.91 0.94  0.91  0.92  0.92
Information  100% (20)  100% (34)  79% (71) 76% (60) 84% 2.01 1.69 2.02  1.64  1.84  1.81
 
1 – high productivity and high quality (HP-HQ), 2 – high productivity but low quality (HP-LQ), 3 – low productivity but high 
quality (LP-HQ), 4 – low productivity and low quality (LP-LQ), Cut-off – is a cut-off value for high quality, defined as a 50% 
percentile value of quality indicator, in brackets are number of observations 
 
In order to highlight which branches are the best practice branches and which are able to 
make improvements by increasing quality or productivity, branches are depicted in two-
dimensional graphs (see Figure 1). In general, the correlation among efficiency and quality 
indicators is low, as it is reported in Table 9, which is also clear in Figure 1. 
 



















































branches are depicted in the 2-dimensions graph DEA score and quality indicators (Penetration and Retention) 
 18 
 
This model specification allows identifying benchmark branches that will move the bank 
to higher productivity and quality. However, the model is unable to quantify efficiency with 
respect to quality. 
 
5.5 Method III — Quality adjusted DEA model 
In the final specification of the standard DEA model, productivity-quality tradeoff is 
completely eliminated by the multi-stage quality adjusted DEA model.
28 Here, all inefficient 
branches are compared to the best practice branches, which are efficient and high quality. The 
average efficiency is the highest at this specification due to quality adjustment, as 
demonstrated in Table 13.
29 
 








M–Count  Obs.  Efficiency  St. dev. Efficiency St. dev. Efficiency St. dev. 
Penetration  185  84%  15%  85% 15% 89% 13% 
Product 1  185  84%  15%  88% 14% 91% 13% 
Product 2+  185  84%  15%  85% 15% 89% 13% 
Product 3+  185  84%  15%  85% 15% 88% 14% 
SQI Total  185  84%  15%  86% 15% 88% 15% 
SQI I  185  84%  15%  87% 15% 90% 14% 
SQI II  185  84%  15%  86% 15% 89% 13% 
SQI III  185  84%  15%  87% 15% 91% 12% 
Retention  185  84%  15%  85% 15% 91% 11% 
Information  185  84%  15%  86% 15% 92% 11% 
 
No quality – standard DEA model, Quality as output – Method I where quality indicator is an additional output factor, 
Quality adjusted – Method III quality adjusted DEA , Efficiency – average efficiency 
 
When efficiency is increased, potential cost reductions decrease. Within the standard 
DEA model, the suggested cost saving is 16%. On other hand, the total potential cost 
reduction by the quality adjusted DEA model is about 10%, which is significantly lower than 
the amount suggested with the standard DEA model when it does not adjust for quality. It was 
also tested to see whether the average efficiency is the same using all methods and the results 
of t-tests demonstrate that there are significant differences in average efficiency on the 
significance level, 5%.
30 This result clearly indicates that service quality has significant 
impact on the efficiency of branch network, and it should be incorporated into DEA models 
and operational processes. 
Distribution of branches according to their efficiency score is shown in Table 14.  There 
are 41-54 best practice branches and another 27-60 branches that are efficient but score low in 
service quality. There are 11-31 branches with an efficiency score below 70%, which means 








                                                           
28 All estimated Spearman rank correlation coefficients are significant and their value range between 0.753-
0.961, which suggests a low sensitivity of model specification.  
29 Results for M–Volume models are in Appendix, Table A5-A7 
30 Due to limited space, detailed results are not reported in the paper 19 
 
Table 14 Distribution of branches based on efficiency score by Quality adjusted DEA model 
M – Count  Average efficiency is below
Quality indicator  Best practice  HP‐LQ  90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
Penetration  48 27  26 30 13 5 0
Product 1  42 60  21 19 13 6 0
Product 2+  48 25  31 27 15 5 0
Product 3+  48 32  25 26 16 9 0
SQI  49 30  20 24 19 12 0
SQI I  54 35  19 24 12 9 1
SQI II  45 28  23 28 14 7 0
SQI III  54 44  21 21 14 4 0
Retention  41 44  22 23 14 1 0
Information  49 48  19 24 10 1 0
 
Best practice – number of best practice branches, HP-LQ – number of branches which have high productivity but low 
quality, Average efficiency is below X% – number of branches which have efficiency score below X% 
 
Characteristics of best practice branches are monitored in Table 15. It indicates that best 
practice branches are mainly in region G, which has the lowest purchasing power; they are 
mainly small branches with 4-6FTEs. The proportion of small branches within the best 
practice branches is 39-67%, depending on the quality indicator used. 
 
Table 15 Description of best practice branches with respect of region and branch size 
 M – Count     Best practice
      Region FTE Branch category 
Quality indicator  All  Region  # % FTE # % Branch category  #  %
Penetration  48  Region G  12 25% 4 6 13% SB  22  46%
Product 1  42  Region A  9 21% 4 5 12% SB  26  62%
Product 2+  48  Region G  13 27% 4 7 15% SB  25  52%
Product 3+  48  Region G and D  11 23% 4 7 15% SB  21  44%
SQI   49  Region G  12 24% 4,6 5 10% SB  29  59%
SQI I  54  Region G and D  12 22% 4 7 13% SB  26  48%
SQI II  45  Region G  12 27% 4,6 5 11% SB  27  60%
SQI III  54  Region F  12 22% 4 8 15% SB  36  67%
Retention  41  Region G  12 29% 4 4 10% SB  16  39%
Information  49  Region A  13 27% 4 6 12% SB  27  55%
 
 SB – small branch, # – number of branches within benchmarks, % – percentage of best practice branches with a certain 
characteristic 
 
This is a surprising result. Managers, based on ratio analysis, assumed that small 
branches are not efficient and large branches are considered the best performers. Also, it is 
documented that the best practice branches are mainly in Region G and not in Region A, as 
was assumed by the bank. These results, however, are in line with other DEA studies
31, such 
as Sherman and Zhu (2006).  
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, there were three methods applied to incorporate the quality dimension 
into the performance of bank branches. Quality of service is measured through service quality, 
product penetration, client information, and retention index. We identified that the 
productivity–quality tradeoff exists and it is possible to avoid through multi-level quality 
adjusted DEA model, where benchmark branches have not only high productivity but high 
                                                           
31 Some DEA studies show that optimal branch is about 6-9 FTEs. It might differ bank by bank depending on 
bank processes. However, most of benchmarking studies show that bigger branches (above 15FTEs) are mostly 
less efficient in terms of activities and customer satisfaction due likely to two reasons: lower complexity (higher 
manageability) and more human-client focused approach. Managers of small branches also act more as owners 
and not officers. 20 
 
service quality as well. Results show that service quality has a significant impact on branch 
efficiency, and it should be incorporated into DEA models and operational processes. The 
essay demonstrates the short-term interaction among service quality and operating branch 
efficiency. 
From a policy perspective, the essay provides evidence that there are real reserves for 
improvement, an average efficiency of 74-84%, which can be realized through optimal 
resource allocations and increasing service quality. We discovered that the main factors of 
efficiency, quality, and productivity-quality tradeoffs are branch size and region, characterized 
by complex indicator purchasing power. There is documented evidence that larger branches 
are less efficient than smaller ones. Results also show that branches in the region with the 
highest purchasing power are not able to fully utilize their opportunities, which implies lower 
efficiency.  Branches that operate efficiently with respect to the number of sold products do 
not necessarily operate efficiently with respect to new volumes on those products. In addition, 
branches are less homogenous with respect to new volume than by number of new products 
sold. 
Benchmark branches are mainly small and are in the region with the lowest purchasing 
power despite managerial expectations. However, the results are in line with other studies 
conducted to DEA research. The most frequent optimal branch size, 4-6 FTEs, indicates that 
optimal branch size should be within this interval. In the future, it will be optimal to open 
small branches or redeploy client officers from large inefficient branches to several small 
efficient ones. Moreover, findings indicate that branch networks should contain a high number 
of small sized branches with only universal client officers and some medium and large 
branches focusing on personal and firm bankers and advisors’ activities. 
Most importantly, the quality indicator that explains efficiency is product penetration. 
Further, the quality level and magnitude of the productivity-quality tradeoff differs by branch 
size and region. Those branches that have high-quality service are measured by mystery 
shopping and mystery calls, and they have less client service meetings, which indicates a 
certain level of tradeoff. Findings demonstrate that large branches focus more on the 
information index and customer service meetings, while small branches are more interested in 
mystery shopping and mystery calls.  Interestingly, branches in regions with high purchasing 
power have worse results in terms of product penetration, mystery shopping, and mystery 
calls than branches with low purchasing power. The largest productivity-quality tradeoff was 










Table A1 Description of input and output factors used in DEA models, data are related to one year 


















































































Table A3 Tradeoff (percentage of effective branches with low quality) by quality indicator and region – 
Method I 
M‐Count  Region A  Region B  Region C Region D Region E Region F Region G  All 
Penetration  43% (3)  50% (2)  20% (1) 23% (3) 0% (0) 40% (4) 27% (4)  28% (17) 
Product 1  10% (1)  30% (3)  57% (4) 69% (9) 71% (5) 58% (7) 71% (10)  53% (39) 
Product 2+  57% (4)  25% (1)  20% (1) 25% (3) 0% (0) 30% (3) 20% (3)  26% (15) 
Product 3+  25% (2)  50% (2)  33% (2) 15% (2) 17% (1) 50% (5) 40% (6)  32% (20) 
SQI Total  83% (5)  20% (1)  29% (2) 38% (6) 17% (1) 9% (1) 31% (5)  31% (21) 
SQI I  71% (5)  67% (4)  38% (3) 29% (5) 14% (1) 21% (3) 39% (7)  36% (28) 
SQI II  67% (4)  17% (1)  38% (3) 38% (5) 17% (1) 50% (5) 29% (4)  37% (23) 
SQI III  67% (4)  29% (2)  38% (3) 56% (9) 0% (0) 23% (3) 56% (9)  41% (30) 
Retention  57% (4)  100% (4)  57% (4) 50% (6) 40% (2) 20% (2) 31% (5)  44% (27) 
Information  33% (4)  75% (3)  60% (3) 46% (6) 60% (3) 73% (8) 56% (9)  55% (36) 
M‐Volume  Region A  Region B  Region C Region D Region E Region F Region G  All 
Penetration  29% (2)  33% (1)  33% (1) 17% (1) 0% (0) 25% (2) 42% (5)  29% (12) 
Product 1  17% (2)  33% (1)  50% (2) 60% (3) 67% (2) 50% (4) 60% (6)  44% (20) 
Product 2+  71% (5)  50% (1)  33% (1) 20% (1) 0% (0) 25% (2) 36% (4)  36% (14) 
Product 3+  29% (2)  33% (1)  67% (2) 0% (0) 33% (1) 14% (1) 42% (5)  30% (12) 
SQI Total  100% (7)  0% (0)  0% (0)  40% (2) 33% (1) 0% (0) 36% (4)  34% (14) 
SQI I  44% (4)  25% (1)  33% (1) 29% (2) 33% (2) 20% (2) 36% (4)  32% (16) 
SQI II  100% (7)  0% (0)  0% (0)  75% (3) 33% (1) 0% (0) 25% (3)  31% (14) 
SQI III  63% (5)  25% (1)  0% (0)  50% (3) 0% (0) 13% (1) 60% (6)  36% (16) 
Retention  43% (3)  100% (2)  100% (3) 60% (3) 0% (0) 29% (2) 55% (6)  51% (19) 
Information  25% (2)  33% (1)  0% (0)  60% (3) 100% (2) 29% (2) 80% (8)  47% (18) 
 
in brackets are number of observations 
 
Table A4 Average efficiency and average value of quality indicators according to the quadrants in 
Method II DEA model 
M – Volume  Average efficiency Average value of quality indicator
Quality indicator  1  2  3 4 All 1 2 3  4  All  Cut‐off
Penetration  100% (22)  100% (12)  68% (71) 69% (80) 74% 1.61 1.48 1.60  1.47  1.54  1.54
Product 1  100% (14)  100% (20)  68% (75) 69% (76) 74% 0.62 0.54 0.64  0.55  0.59  0.58
Product 2+  100% (20)  100% (14)  69% (75) 68% (76) 74% 0.47 0.38 0.45  0.36  0.41  0.42
Product 3+  100% (22)  100% (12)  67% (73) 70% (78) 74% 0.12 0.08 0.12  0.08  0.10  0.10
SQI  100% (20)  100% (14)  71% (73) 67% (78) 74% 0.90 0.82 0.89  0.81  0.85  0.86
SQI I  100% (18)  100% (16)  68% (71) 69% (80) 74% 0.93 0.80 0.93  0.76  0.85  0.87
SQI II  100% (20)  100% (14)  71% (75) 66% (76) 74% 0.74 0.56 0.76  0.57  0.66  0.67
SQI III  100% (18)  100% (16)  72% (74) 65% (77) 74% 0.94 0.85 0.94  0.85  0.89  0.90
Retention  100% (15)  100% (19)  68% (71) 69% (80) 74% 0.94 0.91 0.93  0.91  0.92  0.92
Information  100% (16)  100% (18)  69% (75) 68% (76) 74% 2.04 1.66 2.01  1.66  1.84  1.81
 
1 – high productivity and high quality, 2 – high productivity but low quality, 3 – low productivity but high quality, 4 – low 
productivity and low quality, Cut-off – is a cut-off value for high quality, defined as a 50% percentile value of quality 
indicator, in brackets are number of observations 
 








M–Volume  Obs.  Efficiency   St. dev. Efficiency  St. dev. Efficiency  St. dev. 
Penetration  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 78% 19% 
Product 1  185  74%  19%  79% 19% 83% 18% 
Product 2+  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 80% 18% 
Product 3+  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 77% 19% 
SQI Total  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 78% 19% 
SQI I  185  74%  19%  77% 19% 81% 19% 
SQI II  185  74%  19%  76% 19% 80% 19% 
SQI III  185  74%  19%  76% 19% 83% 17% 
Retention  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 85% 16% 
Information  185  74%  19%  75% 19% 77% 19% 
 
No quality – standard DEA model, Quality as output – Method I where quality indicator is an additional output factor, 








Table A6 Distribution of branches based on efficiency score by Method III - Quality adjusted DEA 
model 
M – Volume  Average efficiency is below
Quality indicator  Best practice  HP‐LQ  90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
Penetration  32 15  117 101 70 36 14
Product 1  33 37  97 77 52 29 11
Product 2+  32 20  108 91 60 27 8
Product 3+  34 14  120 100 72 41 15
SQI  30 20  112 97 71 38 14
SQI I  35 27  101 82 60 33 13
SQI II  37 24  110 94 62 33 11
SQI III  37 31  95 80 53 19 6
Retention  36 33  95 75 38 17 3
Information  26 20  118 103 75 37 14
 
Best practice – number of best practice branches, HP-LQ – number of branches which have high productivity but low 
quality, Average efficiency is below X% – number of branches which have efficiency score below X% 
 
Table A7 Description of best practice branches in Method III with respect of region and branch size 
 M – Volume     Best practice
      Region FTE Branch category 
Quality factor  All  Region  # % FTE # % Branch category  #  %
Penetration  32  Region G  7 22% 4 5 16% SB  18  56%
Product 1  33  Region A  12 36% 6 5 15% SB  20  61%
Product 2+  32  Region G  9 28% 4 4 13% SB  18  56%
Product 3+  34  Region G  8 24% 4 8 24% SB  19  56%
SQI  30  Region F  10 33% 5,6 4 13% SB  22  73%
SQI I  35  Region F  8 23% 4 7 20% SB  21  60%
SQI II  37  Region G  10 27% 5,6 5 14% SB  26  70%
SQI III  37  Region F  10 27% 5 6 16% SB  27  73%
Retention  36  Region F  10 28% 4 6 17% SB  23  64%
Information  26  Region A and F  7 27% 4 6 23% SB  19  73%
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